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Abstract 
This paper seeks to enhance understanding of the formulation and accuracy of 
Department of Defense (DoD) Comptroller projected obligation rates in the defense 
acquisition sector. These projections are published annually for each appropriation account 
in the Financial Summary Tables released by the office of the DoD Comptroller. To 
understand the implications of these forecasts on the contracting acquisition area, this paper 
compares the Comptroller projected obligation rates for procurement accounts with actual 
obligation rates as well as budget execution benchmarks also compiled by the Comptroller’s 
office. It assesses the reliability of the projections and their consistency with other DoD 
targets, identifies trends in the accuracy of obligations rates across different accounts, and 
attempts to isolate factors that may influence the formulation and accuracy of the 
projections. 
Introduction 
Obligation rates are considered one of the “key financial metrics” for the Department 
of Defense (DoD) in monitoring how programs allocate their funding and whether they 
remain on schedule (Unobligated Balances, 2006). While budget authority and total 
obligational authority track how much money is appropriated by Congress each year, 
obligations track how funding is committed by signing contracts, employing personnel, or 
otherwise making commitments to spend money (Schwartz et al., 2018). When determining 
the amount of funding that may be made available for an appropriation account in an 
upcoming fiscal year, DoD offices and the authorization and appropriations committees in 
Congress take previous years’ actual obligation rates into consideration (Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency [DSCA], 2012). Programs that have not been able to adequately 
obligate prior year funding are less likely to receive the funding they are requesting for future 
years and, in more extreme cases, may have prior year unobligated funding rescinded by 
Congress. 
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller; OUSDC) publishes a 
baseline standard for cumulative obligation and expenditure rates by title of funding 
(procurement, RDT&E, O&M, etc.). This table of benchmarks, derived from 30 years of 
execution history, is intended to serve as a rule-of-thumb for the military services when 
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planning their program expenditures (Conley et al., 2014, pp. vi–vii). For procurement 
accounts, the benchmarks state that a cumulative 80% of the funding should be obligated by 
the end of the first year, 90% by the end of the second year, and 100% by the end of the 
third year (when the funding would otherwise expire; OUSDC, 2017). Expenditure rates are 
higher for RDT&E accounts given their two-year period of availability. It is expected that 
90% of RDT&E funding should be obligated by the end of the first year and 100% by the end 
of the second year (OUSDC, 2017). Congressional staffs use this table as a baseline 
reference for judging whether particular funding lines and programs are obligating money on 
track or are falling behind. 
The Comptroller’s office also publishes Financial Summary Tables annually with the 
president’s budget request that include a more granular projection of obligation rates by 
individual appropriation account. These projected rates, presented as a percentage of “total 
operating authority,” represent the percent of a particular budget year of funding that the 
DoD expects to obligate over the course of the fiscal years that follow. Importantly, the 
Comptroller projected obligation rates are not cumulative, whereas the Comptroller 
benchmarks are cumulative obligation rates. For example, in the Army’s Aircraft 
Procurement FY 2017 appropriations, DoD projected that 64.44% will be obligated in FY 
2017, 25.00% in FY 2018, and 10.56% in FY 2019 (OUSDC, 2016, p. 004). Since this is a 
procurement account, the money is only available for three years and any leftover funding 
after that time would expire. In comparison, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) funding must be fully obligated within two years, while Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) accounts must be obligated within one year 
(Schwartz, 2017).  
Given the obligation rate benchmarks set by the Department, one would expect most 
if not all of the projections for the first year of obligations to meet or exceed the 80% 
threshold. However, the projected obligation rates fail to meet the execution benchmarks for 
many accounts. This lack of alignment poses questions over the usefulness of the 
projections as well as their accuracy in anticipating the rate of actual obligations. Similarly, 
the lack of change in the projections from year to year (the Army Aircraft Procurement 
account has had identical projections from FY 2013 through FY 2019), even as the funding 
and status of programs within the accounts changed considerably, calls into question the 
DoD’s model for deriving projected obligation rates. 
Obligation rates can be important for industry and investors as a measure of 
government contracting for current and future fiscal years. Private sector partners rely on 
projections for their own strategic planning, forecasting the overall potential for sales and 
revenue for the defense industry based in part on the expected obligation rates. 
Consequently, the obligation and outlay rates can impact the stock valuations of companies 
via their revenue forecasts. These projections are also important to defense companies 
themselves, particularly smaller ones, because the timing of programs can mean the 
difference between smooth cash flow and challenges to solvency. Given the significance 
these forecasts play in the acquisition sector, inaccurate projections could contribute to poor 
decision-making in the private sector that could lead to inefficiencies in the market and sub-
optimum management decisions within companies. 
In an effort to assess the reliability and accuracy of the Comptroller projected 
obligation rates, this paper provides an analysis of the projections for procurement accounts. 
It includes a survey of the projected obligation rates for a variety of procurement accounts 
from FY 2012 to FY 2019 and compares those projections against both the obligation rate 
benchmarks and actual obligation rates (from FY 2012 to FY 2015). The paper analyzes that 
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data by military department and certain types of account to identify trends and draw 
conclusions. 
Literature Review 
Previous studies have assessed the execution of DoD programs against the 
Department’s obligation rate goals. A 2013 Defense Acquisition University (DAU) report 
examined potential causal factors preventing acquisition programs from meeting the 
execution benchmarks. The study surveyed 229 DoD personnel who ranked the impact of 
64 factors on the performance of acquisition programs. According to the results, the late 
release of full obligation/budget authority due to continuing resolution authority, contract 
negotiations’ delays, and contract award delays had the highest adverse impact on the 
achievement of execution goals (Tremaine & Kinnear-Seligman, 2013). 
A 2014 study from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) similarly assessed the 
underperformance of acquisition programs against the Comptroller execution benchmarks 
and investigated factors related to program execution. The report found that the rates for 
procurement obligations and RDT&E disbursements have been decreasing since 2006 and 
2009, respectively. While the research team found that the benchmarks—though “potentially 
arbitrary to some extent”—are “a reasonable means of identifying funds for possible 
reallocation to higher priority needs,” it concluded that “management attention unduly 
focuses on meeting benchmarks” and offered recommendations to improve program 
execution (Conley et al., 2014, pp. vi–vii). 
Both of the aforementioned studies focused on the execution of acquisition programs 
against the benchmarks for obligation and expenditure rates. This paper builds on the 
existing research by comparing the actual obligation rates against the Comptroller projected 
obligation rates found in the Financial Summary Tables and the Comptroller benchmarks. 
Given the focus on the Comptroller projected obligation rates, this study is also conducted at 
the broader appropriation account level rather than the budget line level of detail used in the 
IDA analysis. 
Methodology 
Collecting Comptroller Projected Obligation Rates 
The analysis in this report was conducted in three phases. The first phase entailed 
the collection of the Comptroller projected obligation rates from Section F of the Financial 
Summary Tables. Projections were captured for procurement appropriation accounts from 
FY 2012 to FY 2019. Data collection posed a challenge given the Financial Summary 
Tables’ lack of a machine-readable format, forcing the research team to manually input the 
projections. 
The research team then measured how often the projected obligation rates change 
from fiscal year to fiscal year before comparing them to the cumulative program execution 
benchmarks. The projections for procurement accounts were assessed to determine how 
often they met the 80% threshold for the first year of obligations and 90% for the second 
year. Accounts’ alignment with the benchmarks were measured as a percentage of the total 
number of budget years in which the projected obligation rates met or exceeded the 
benchmarks. For the purposes of this analysis, the term “budget year” is used to refer to the 
year in which funding is originally appropriated for an account. Funding can then be 
obligated in that fiscal year and in the fiscal years that follow.  
The research team studied 18 procurement accounts. Several procurement accounts 
were excluded from the analysis as exceptions because they do not follow the standard 
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obligation practices for procurement accounts. They include Shipbuilding & Conversion, 
Navy; Coastal Defense Augmentation; Defense Production Act Purchases; Chemical Agents 
& Munitions Destruction; and the MRAP Vehicle Fund.  
Two procurement accounts contain less data than the other accounts. The Space 
Procurement, Air Force account was only created in FY 2016 so there are only four budget 
years’ worth of projections and no budget years’ worth of actual obligation rates. The 
National Guard and Reserve Equipment account also lacked projections for FY 2019. 
Calculating Actual Obligation Rates 
The second phase of this analysis entailed the calculation of the actual obligation 
rates of the selected procurement accounts. To calculate the actual obligation rate of funds, 
the total obligations in a given fiscal year from a particular budget year’s funding is divided 
by the total available for obligation for that budget year including any adjustments that may 
occur in subsequent fiscal years. This data can be found in Section G of the Financial 
Summary Tables. 
For example, as shown in Table 1, the Aircraft Procurement, Army account had 
$5,902,609,000 available for obligation for budget year 2015. Over the next two fiscal years, 
Congress and the DoD made adjustments to the 2015 budget year funding in this account, 
totaling a net addition in funding of $455,317,000 in FY 2016 and $105,597,000 in FY 2017, 
as shown in Table 1. Thus, the total budget year 2015 funding for this account ended up 
being $6,453,523,000. This is the total available for obligation used in the denominator when 
calculating the actual obligation rate for each year. As shown in Table 2, the total obligations 
in each fiscal year of the specific budget year’s funding is then divided by the total available 
to calculate the actual rate of obligation for each fiscal year. Actual obligation rates were 
only calculated for budget years from 2012 to 2015 due to the lack of complete data (i.e., 
final appropriated and executed amounts) for budget years 2016 through 2019. 
 
Table 1. Aircraft Procurement, Army Budget Year 2015 Funding 
Budget Year 2015 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 Final 
Budget Authority $5,799,286,0
00 
-$25,000,000 -$15,000,000  
Balances Transferred  -$13,000,000 -$22,257,000  
Recoveries of Prior 
Year Obligations 
 $464,861,000 $72,995,000  
Reimbursable Orders $103,323,000 $18,456,000 $69,859,000  
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Table 2. Aircraft Procurement, Army Budget Year 2015 Obligations and Obligation Rates 
Budget Year 2015 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 
Total Obligations $3,950,184 $1,875,308 $536,183 








Obligation Rate 61.21% 29.06% 6.64% 
Cumulative Obligations 61.21% 90.27% 96.91% 
 
Comparing Projected Obligation Rates and Actual Obligation Rates 
The actual obligation rates calculated in the second phase of the study were then 
compared to the historically-derived benchmarks for procurement accounts to determine 
which accounts met the 80% obligation rate goal after one year of execution and 90% after 
two years. The accounts were then measured against the Comptroller projected obligation 
rates to assess the projections’ accuracy on an account by account basis.  
To compare the accuracy of projections for different procurement accounts, the 
research team calculated the difference between the actuals and projections for each of the 
three fiscal years that each budget year of funding was available for obligation. Those 
differences were then averaged for each fiscal year of availability for an account. In addition 
to assessing the average projection error for each year of availability by account, the 
research team also aggregated the data by military department. The differences between 
projections and actuals were averaged by fiscal year across all accounts associated with 
each department rather than calculating the department average from the overall account 
average. The median difference by military department was also calculated to compare 
against the average and is located in the appendix of the report. 
Analysis 
Year-Over-Year Changes in Procurement Account Projected Obligation Rates 
Of the 16 procurement accounts containing the complete eight years’ worth of 
projections from budget years 2012 through 2019, one account possessed identical 
projections for all eight years; 12 possessed identical projections for seven of the eight 
years; two possessed identical projections for six of the eight years; and one possessed 
identical projections for five of the eight years. 
It is somewhat counterintuitive that the projected obligation rates at the account level 
stay fairly consistent over time because the status and mix of programs within each account 
can vary considerably from year to year. One might expect that the procurement obligation 
rate would be slower for programs that are transitioning from development to procurement, 
are ramping up procurement, or are having contract award and negotiation issues. The fact 
that the projected obligation rates stay consistent from year to year suggests that these 
projections are not based on the execution plans of the programs within the accounts and 
are instead based on historical rates or aspirational obligation plans. 
Moreover, the consistency of the accounts’ projected obligation rates from year-to-
year does not translate into alignment with the benchmarks established for budget 
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execution. As shown in Table 3, a majority of the accounts surveyed in the study projected 
their obligation rate for the first year of availability would be under the 80% goal. Only 31% 
of the 139 budget years assessed in this study projected that the obligation rate for the first 
year of funding would meet or exceed 80%. The Navy was the only military department that 
had a majority of its first year projections achieve the goal established by the Comptroller’s 
office.  
The lack of alignment between the projected obligation rates and historically-derived 
benchmarks could come as a result of delays in defense appropriations. Between FY 2011 
and FY 2018, appropriations for defense were delayed on average by 139 days (including 
days under continuing resolutions and government shutdowns). These delays in 
appropriations would translate into delays in obligations, leading to obligation rates under 
80%. According to the IDA study, obligation rate goals were lowered for 2013 and 2014 to 
62% and 66%, respectively, “in recognition of the increasing difficulties that acquisition 
programs have in meeting the historical execution benchmarks” (Conley et al., 2014, pp. 5–
6). However, this paper did not assess the change in projected obligation rates from budget 
years prior to 2012 to determine whether lack of alignment with the benchmarks correlates 
with delays in defense appropriations because it was beyond the scope of this effort. 
 





Years with First 
Year Projection ≥ 
80% 
Total Number of 
Account-Budget 
Years of Data 
Percentage of Account-
Budget Year Projections 
Meeting or Exceeding First 
Year Benchmarks 
Army 11 40 27.5% 
Navy 25 40 62.5% 
Air Force 4 36 11.1% 
Other1 3 23 13.0% 
TOTAL 43 139 30.9% 
 
As shown in Table 4, a majority of the overall account budget year projections 
aligned with the two-year benchmark of 90% of funds obligated. However, fewer than half of 
                                            
 
 
1 The “Other” category throughout the tables in this report include the following accounts: Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund; Procurement, Defense-Wide; and National Guard and 
Reserve Equipment.  
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the Army’s two-year projections anticipated meeting the 90% goal while four-fifths of Navy 
and Air Force account budget year projections met or exceeded the benchmark. 





Years with Second 
Year Projection ≥ 
90% 
Total Number of 
Account-Budget 
Years of Data 
Percentage of Account-
Budget Year Projections 
Meeting or Exceeding 
Second Year Benchmarks 
Army 19 40 47.5% 
Navy 32 40 80.0% 
Air Force 29 36 80.6% 
Other 18 23 78.3% 
TOTAL 98 139 70.5% 
 
Comparing Actual Obligation Rates to Execution Benchmarks 
While the previous analysis compares the projected obligation rates to the 
Comptroller execution benchmarks, this section compares the actual obligation rates to the 
execution benchmarks. As discussed in the methodology section, actual obligation rates 
were only calculated for four budget years (2012 to 2015) due to the lack of complete data 
for subsequent years. When compared to the cumulative execution benchmark rates, the 
majority of the actual obligation rates failed to meet both the one- and two-year targets of 
80% and 90%, respectively.  
As shown in Table 5, only 13% of 68 account budget years assessed met or 
exceeded the targeted goal for the first year of obligations, a smaller proportion than the 
29% for projected obligation rates. The Air Force and Navy had the highest number of 
account budget years that matched or surpassed the 80% goal with four each. None of the 
Army’s accounts met the benchmark, while approximately 28% were projected to do so, 
according to the previous section. 
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Years with First Year 






Budget Year Actuals 
Meeting or Exceeding First 
Year Benchmarks 
Army 0 20 0.0% 
Navy 4 20 20.0% 
Air Force 4 16 25.0% 
Other 1 12 8.3% 
TOTAL 9 68 13.2% 
 
The actual obligation rates performed better against the two-year execution 
benchmark of 90%. Nearly half (46%) of the total 68 account budget years obligated 
90% or more of their funds by the end of the second year of availability. Relative to 
the Army and Air Force, which only saw 15% and 38% of their respective account 
budget years meet the threshold, the Navy Department impressed with 70% of its 20 
account budget years reaching a 90% obligation rate. If the Marine Corps is 
excluded, that figure improves to 88% of the Navy’s budget years for procurement 
accounts as a service.  





with Second Year 







Budget Year Actuals 
Meeting or Exceeding 
Second Year Benchmarks 
Army 3 20 15.0% 
Navy 14 20 70.0% 
Air Force 6 16 37.5% 
Other 8 12 66.7% 
TOTAL 31 68 45.6% 
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All four account-budget years of the Air Force’s “other procurement” account met 
both the 80% benchmark with an average obligation rate of 91.7% for the first year of 
availability and the 90% benchmark with an average obligation rate of 97.3% over the first 
two years of availability. Such high rates, which are exceptions to the rest of the Air Force’s 
actual obligation rates, may be attributed to the large amount of classified “pass-through” 
funding in this account (Hlad, 2016). 
Measuring the Accuracy of Projected Obligation Rates Against Actual Obligation 
Rates 
While the actual obligation rates for the procurement account budget years surveyed 
underperformed against the historically-derived benchmarks, the question remains how 
accurate the Comptroller projected obligation rates are in comparison with the actual 
obligation rates. Table 7 shows the average difference between the projected and actual 
obligation rate over the three years of funding availability for each procurement account. On 
average, the difference between the projected and actual obligation rates was approximately 
14% for the first year of availability, 9% for the second year, and 6% for the third. Assessed 
by department, the Navy had the smallest average difference between its estimates and 
actuals with 8% for the first year, 7% for the second, and 5% for the third. If the Marine 
Corps is excluded from the Navy’s average, the difference drops to 7%, 6%, and 3%, 
respectively, for the three years of availability. It is worth noting that across the different 
phases of this study, the Navy’s projected and actual obligation rates were best aligned with 
the execution benchmarks, and its projections were the most accurate overall compared to 
the other military departments. 
The Army had the largest average difference between its projections and actuals at 
16% for the first year, 10% for the second, and 7% for the third. The error was driven by a 
25% average difference between the projected obligation rate and actuals for the first year 
of availability in the Army’s missile procurement account—the largest difference of any 
procurement account belonging to the three military departments. The Army anticipated 
obligating an average of approximately 83% of its account funding in the first year of 
availability for budget years 2012–2015, yet only obligated 58% of funding on average. 
Another comparison between the three military departments’ actual obligation rates 
can be made by assessing the aircraft procurement accounts of each. While the three 
accounts are not like-for-like comparisons given they procure different platforms and 
possess different funding levels (e.g., for the 2015 budget year, total obligations for Army 
aircraft procurement were $6,361,675,000 in current dollars; $16,308,912,000 for the Navy; 
and $12,187,879,000 for the Air Force), they nevertheless provide some standardization in 
comparison. As shown in the data in Table 7, the Navy and Army had similar average 
differences between their projections and actuals over the three years of availability. 
However, the average differences for the Air Force’s aircraft procurement account were 
more than double those of the Navy and Army for the first two years of availability. 
A comparison of the average and median difference between projected and actual 
obligation rate for the military departments can be found in the appendix.   
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Table 7. Average Difference Between Projected and Actual Obligation Rate by Account, 
Budget Years 2012–20152 
Account First Year Second Year Third Year 
Aircraft Procurement, Army 6.76% 4.80% 3.04% 
Missile Procurement, Army 24.55% 14.47% 9.78% 
W&TCV Procurement, Army 19.18% 11.73% 7.41% 
Ammo Procurement, Army 12.26% 4.31% 9.51% 
Other Procurement, Army 15.18% 14.20% 3.78% 
Total Army Procurement 15.58% 9.90% 6.70% 
Aircraft Procurement, Navy 6.92% 4.69% 2.36% 
Weapons Procurement, Navy 5.42% 5.61% 4.22% 
Ammo Procurement, Navy 3.64% 4.30% 2.05% 
Other Procurement, Navy 11.41% 11.10% 2.51% 
Procurement, Marine Corps 12.41% 10.11% 14.50% 
Total Navy Procurement 7.96% 7.16% 5.13% 
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force 19.83% 14.77% 5.17% 
Missile Procurement, Air Force 12.50% 11.07% 1.51% 
Ammo Procurement, Air Force 12.26% 4.31% 9.51% 
Other Procurement, Air Force 12.06% 10.27% 2.10% 
Total Air Force Procurement 14.16% 10.11% 4.57% 
JIEDDF 18.00% 15.56% 2.95% 
Procurement, Defense-Wide 4.31% 3.81% 2.74% 
National Guard & Reserve Equip. 37.31% 15.00% 21.55% 
Total Other Procurement 19.87% 11.46% 9.08% 
TOTAL 13.76% 9.42% 6.16% 
                                            
 
 
2 Averages for the overall military departments represent average of all budget years’ rates 
associated with a particular department’s procurement accounts, not an average of the account 
averages. 
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Conclusion 
This paper presents a preliminary set of analysis for procurement accounts only. The 
final report of this project will analyze other titles of the budget, particularly RDT&E and 
MILCON, to determine if similar trends are evident. The full analysis will also include 
additional years of budget data to examine longitudinal trends in obligation rates. While this 
analysis examined only a subset of the budget execution data, namely procurement 
accounts from FY 2012 to FY 2019, it yields a number of interesting findings: 
● The projected obligation rates vary little from year to year within a particular 
procurement account. This suggests that the services do not regularly re-
evaluate the projections for accuracy, nor do they attempt to adjust projections 
based on the plans of programs within the account.  
● Just over half (51%) of the projected obligation rates for the first and second year 
of funding availability meet or exceed the corresponding execution benchmarks.  
● While the projected obligations rates tend to be lower than the benchmarks, the 
actual obligation rates tend to be even lower than the projected rates.  
● The difference between projected and actual obligation rates vary considerably 
across accounts, with some of the largest discrepancies in Missile Procurement, 
Army; Wheeled and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army; and Aircraft Procurement, 
Air Force. 
● The difference between the actual and projected obligation rates tend to narrow 
in the second and third year of funding availability. This suggests that while 
programs may be slower than expected executing funding in the first year it is 
available, they tend to catch up in subsequent years. 
● The actual obligation rates fall well below the execution benchmarks, with just 
13.2% of accounts meeting the benchmark standard in the first year and 45.6% 
in the second year. 
● Overall, the Navy does the best at meeting its own projected obligation rates and 
the Comptroller benchmarks. 
A central observation from this analysis is that the Comptroller benchmarks may not 
be a useful way to measure program execution. This is because the services do not appear 
to be planning or expecting to meet the benchmarks from the outset of the appropriations 
process, and it is not clear who, if anyone, is using the projected obligation rates. The 
benchmarks, however, are used by the Comptroller and congressional staff to gauge the 
execution of programs. However, the data suggests that if the intention of the benchmarks is 
to have a common standard based on historical execution patterns by which to hold 
programs accountable, then the benchmarks may need to be updated to account for 
changing patterns in the congressional budgeting process. For example, over the past 10 
years the frequency and length of continuing resolutions has increased markedly, which 
may be having a systemic impact on the ability of programs to obligate funding in the first 
year of availability (Harrison & Daniels, 2017, pp. 4–5). Moreover, a common set of 
execution benchmarks may not be realistic because of the wide variation observed in the 
actual obligation rates across procurement accounts. 
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Appendix. Average and Median Difference Between Projected and Actual 
Obligation Rate by Military Department, Budget Years 2012–2015 
Military 
Department 
First Year Second Year Third Year 
Army - Avg. 15.58% 9.90% 6.70% 
Army - Med. 15.36% 8.60% 6.33% 
Navy - Avg. 7.96% 7.16% 5.13% 
Navy - Med. 5.97% 7.34% 3.37% 
Air Force - Avg. 14.16% 10.11% 4.57% 
Air Force - Med. 13.19% 9.54% 1.90% 
Other - Avg. 19.87% 11.46% 9.08% 
Other - Med. 12.54% 8.23% 3.22% 
Total - Avg. 13.76% 9.42% 6.16% 
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